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How does an artist’s death impact on the price of his or her works of art? We investigate this 
question in an infinite-horizon dynamic general equilibrium setting. Employing the open-loop 
Stackelberg equilibrium concept to describe the interactive behaviour of collectors and artists, 
we find that the art price remains at some well-defined "pseudo-competitive" level as long as 
the artist is alive. Only when the artist unexpectedly dies, the price increases on impact. This 
so-called death eﬀect varies negatively with the artist’s age at death. If it is well known that 
an artist is ailing from some terminal illness and his or her death thus does not come as a 
surprise, the price of the ailing artist’s work increases when the news of the ailment is 
divulged; the price immediately jumps to the level which will prevail at the time when the 
artist dies. 
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In this paper we investigate how an artist’s death aﬀects the price of his or her works of art.
Our study thus contributes to the literature on art price formation. In contrast to the bulk of
this literature we do, however, not restrict our analysis to the demand side of the art market;
our study gives due weight to the channels of inﬂuence which work through the supply side.
In particular, we explicitly make allowance for the fact that production ceases when the artist
dies, implying that the collectors can be sure that in the future no new similar pieces of art
will put pressure on the prices in this speciﬁc market segment. More speciﬁcally, we provide
a microeconomic foundation for the so-called death eﬀect hypothesis which maintains that
an artist’s death causes a sudden change in the price of his or her works of art. Empirical
studies that have identiﬁed death-related changes in art prices include Ekelund et al. (2000),
Maddison and Jul-Pedersen (2007), and Ursprung and Wiermann (2008).
By insisting that the supply side of the art market is of crucial importance for understanding
art price formation, we do, of course, not mean to denigrate the established literature which
focuses on the demand side. Precisely because we believe that both sides of the market and,
in particular, the interaction of demand and supply side eﬀects are instrumental in the pricing
of works of art, our analysis is closely connected to the established literature on art price
formation.1
1The literature on art price formation is multifacetted. Making use of auction price records (for a survey of
the literature on art auctions, see Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2006), many studies start out with the construction
of some kind of art price index (see Ginsburgh et al., 2006). These indices usually cover whole market segments
— such as certain periods, media, and levels of artistic quality (for example master pieces versus lower end
works). The classic 1974 paper by Anderson, for example, investigates the markets for Old Master paintings,
English 18th and 19th century art, Impressionists and 20th century paintings. The media covered in the
literature include paintings, prints, and sculptures. Price indices have, however, also been developed for
selected famous individual artists such as Picasso (cf. Czujack, 1997). Two diﬀerent methods have been used
to construct art price indices: the hedonic regression method pioneered by Anderson (1974) and the repeated-
sales method used in Baumol’s inﬂuential 1986 paper (for a comparison of the two approaches see Chanel
et al., 1996). Art price indices reveal information about the eﬃciency of art markets and they are a crucial
prerequisite for estimating rates of returns on investments in objects of visual art. The respective literature
indicates that art markets are surprisingly eﬃcient even though stable patterns of minor deviations from the
law of one price can be identiﬁed (see, for example, Pesando, 1993) and estimates of pre-sale auction prices
made by experts are slightly biased (see, for example, Bauwens and Ginsburgh, 2000).
As far as the ﬁnancial rates of return are concerned, there is general agreement that returns in the art
market are low and risk is high. Not surprisingly, the rates of returns depend on trends in tastes, implying
that certain genres and pieces from certain periods may fetch returns that are much higher than average returns.
Interestingly, master pieces appear to underperform from a ﬁnancial point of view (see Mei and Moses, 2002).
This, however, is quite in line with the notion that master pieces provide a higher non-ﬁnancial return, i.e.
more pleasure of consumption. More recently, the correlation patterns of art and ﬁnancial asset returns have
1Even though economic investigations into the technology and perspicacious planning of art
production are still grossly underrepresented in the cultural economics literature, there are no-
table exceptions. David Galenson, in particular, has made a valiant attempt at characterizing
the working methods of visual artists (see, for example, Galenson, 2006). He distinguishes be-
tween experimental innovators who arrive at their major contributions by a time-consuming
learning—by-doing process and conceptual innovators whose work is based on radical new
ideas that can be turned into artistic output without a great deal of craftsmanship. To be
sure, this dichotomous distinction oversimpliﬁes matters and therefore exposes any resulting
classiﬁcation of artists to critical inquiries (see, for example, Ginsburgh and Weyers, 2006).
Nevertheless, if it is fair to say that with the onset of impressionism in the 1860s experiment-
based techniques gave more and more way to techniques relying on conceptual imagination,
this switch in production technology may well be explained by the growing media attention
given to artists and the increasing importance of the gallery system, both of which depend on
as t e a d yﬂow of innovation and an ever increasing number of solvent collectors. In any event,
most scholars seem to agree that the supply of works of art and the technology of artistic
production are intimately related to the nature of demand, implying that a well balanced
portrait of the art market needs to model the demand as well as the supply side.
Our study embraces this integrated view and explicitly models the interaction of the agents
on the supply and the demand side of the art market, i.e. the producing artists and the con-
suming collectors. We portray the artists as manufacturers who operate in an environment of
monopolistic competition and set their output at a level commensurate with their objectives.2
This view of artistic production, which presupposes a great deal of ﬂexibility in the quantity
produced, corresponds to the self-evaluation of conceptual artists who appear to dominate
today’s art market. Frank Stella, for example, thought that a good pictorial idea is worth
more than a lot of manual dexterity, Sol LeWitt had his work often executed by draftsmen
because he insisted that all the planning and decisions are made beforehand (which relegates
been investigated with a view to detecting potential diversiﬁcation gains deriving from the inclusion of art
in traditional portfolios. Whether such diversiﬁcation gains are indeed available appears, however, to be a
still unresolved issue (see, for example, Worthington and Higgs, 2004, and Campbell, 2004, for two diﬀerent
results).
2The monopoly position of artists is especially strong because the consumers (collectors) themselves set
great value in the fact that the consumed works of art can indubitably be traced to the producer.
2the execution to a perfunctory aﬀair), and Andy Warhol de-emphasized craftsmanship to such
an extent that his paintings were manufactured in his "factory" in about four minutes a piece
(all quoted directly or indirectly from Galenson and Weinberg, 2000, pp. 767-8). These exam-
ples may be extreme, but they indicate that art production is certainly more ﬂexible than the
traditional conception of the artist may convey. As has already been observed in the pioneer-
ing study by Ekelund et al. (2000), the artists are, in principle, in a position to ﬂood their
own market, and, since works of visual art are durable, ﬁnd themselves in the tricky situation
described by Coase (1972): either they are able to credibly commit to restrained production in
the future which allows them to exploit their monopoly position, or, if no commitment device
is available, they are forced to produce along the time-consistent production path which will
exert a downward pressure on the prices of their works of art.
The general issue raised in this paper, even though motivated by the speciﬁcities of art
production, clearly transcends the art market setting. From an industrial organization point
of view, we deal here with precisely those circumstances that also characterize the interplay of
consumer expectations and time consistent producer behavior in the classical problem faced
by monopolistic durable goods producers. The distinguishing feature of our study is that we
explicitly consider the fact that the producer may, with a certain probability, cease to exist at
every point of time. In the case of art production, this additional feature is an obvious fact of
life (or rather death), but the assumption of ﬁnitely lived producers may also portray common
aspects of business life such as production cessation due to new regulatory constraints.
To analyze the pertinent market interactions, we present a dynamic general equilibrium
model populated with perfectly rational producers and consumers. Standard models of durable
goods monopolies employ in this context the concept of the perfect Markov equilibrium (PME)
which is deﬁned by a pair of continuous functions which only depend on the current state
of the system; one of these functions describes the buyers’ expectations, the other one the
monopolist’s sale strategy (see, e.g. Stokey, 1981, Kahn, 1986, Bond and Samuelson, 1987,
Karp, 1996, and Driskill, 1997). In equilibrium, the buyers’ expectations are satisﬁed along the
realized path of production and the seller’s strategy maximizes the present discounted value
of proﬁts, given the buyers’ expectations. Moreover, the PME solution entails the property of
3time consistency.
A severe drawback of the standard approach is, however, that the PME approach, as a
rule, presupposes that expectations and production depend only on the state of the system
as described by the produced stock of the durable good. This assumption does not allow
incorporating new information, since the produced stock of the durable good does not change
if the system is unexpectedly perturbed. Since the state variable does not reﬂect perturbations,
expectations are not aﬀected either, and neither is production because the feedback function
is autonomous, i.e. independent of time. Hence, we cannot directly apply this approach to
analyze death eﬀects. Abolishing the assumption of a univariate representation of the system’s
state, i.e. allowing price expectations to depend not only on the stock of production but also on
other factors which reﬂect news, unfortunately turns out not to be a passable escape because
in such a framework it is, in general, impossible to derive closed solutions.
For these reasons we do not use the PME approach in our study, but rather resort to
the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium concept (see, e.g. Dockner et al., 2000). The open-
loop Stackelberg equilibrium (OLSE) as applied to our setting implies that the art collectors
(buyers) hold rational expectations and the artist acts as a Stackelberg leader, taking into
account the intertemporal optimizing behavior of the collectors. Since this approach does not
yield the time-consistent production path, we focus our analysis of the long-run dynamics of
the system on the situation in which the artist can credibly commit to a production plan
which he or she communicates to the potential collectors at the onset of his or her carrier. In
the case of artistic production it may not be too farfetched to assume that artists indeed do
stick to idiosyncratic production strategies which are dictated by their artistic temperament.
Using this setup, we derive several results. First, we show that a unique stable accumulation
path of works of art exists. Second, even though artistic production is spread over time, the
art price equals at any point of time some counterfactual price that would prevail if the artist
were immortal. Having established these results, we then continue to show that the behavior
of the linearized version of the dynamic system does not depend on the chosen control path.
In other words, the linearized system captures the local behavior irrespective of whether the
artist is able to commit to the optimal control path or is forced to follow the time-consistent
4production plan. This insight allows us to draw the following universally valid conclusions with
respect to the death eﬀect: regardless of whether the death of the artist comes as a surprise
or is anticipated (if, for example, the artist has been suﬀering from a terminal disease), the
price of the artist’s oeuvre will jump to its ﬁnal level at the moment when the news of the
artist’s death or impending death is revealed. Moreover, we show that the size of the death
eﬀect varies negatively with the artist’s age at death.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic general equilibrium model
which describes the behavior of the consumers (i.e. the collectors) and the behavior of the
durable goods monopolist (i.e. the artist). In section 3, we analyze the steady-state and
dynamic stability properties of our model. The inﬂuence of the model’s crucial structural pa-
rameters on the price and the production of works of art, as well as the associated comparative-
dynamic properties of the model are discussed in section 4. In section 5, we then turn to the
impact eﬀect of an artist’s death, be it unexpected or expected. Section 6 concludes. Some
technical details are relegated to the appendices.
2 The Model
2.1 The demand side: the collectors’ behavior
O nt h ed e m a n ds i d e ,w ei d e n t i f yt h ec o l l e c t o r sa st h eﬁnal consumers of works of art. We
thus side step the issue of potential market makers (galleries, museums, art fairs, the deceased
artist’s estates, etc.) by assuming that these institutions, which admittedly play an important
role in the art market, can be portrayed as intermediaries without any market power.
Assume a unity-mass of collectors who are identical in terms of preferences and income.
Collectors are thus price takers in the sense that the behavior of any single collector has no
inﬂuence on the market price, but in the aggregate the behavior of all collectors does, of course,
have a noticeable impact on the price. At any time s the collectors have inﬁnite planning
horizons. We assume that the collectors cannot access the capital market in order to satisfy
their artistic cravings. The collectors derive instantaneous utility from the consumption of a
composite non-durable (numeraire) good x(s) and a ﬂow of services proportional to the stock
5Q(s) of the artist’s works they own at time s, which captures aesthetic pleasure from holding
works of art. The representative collector j’s utility function U (xj (s),Q j (s)) is assumed to be
increasing in its respective arguments, continuously twice-diﬀerentiable and strictly concave.
Let qj (s) be the representative collector’s ﬂow purchases or sales of works of art. We assume
that the stock (oeuvre) of the artist’s works takes a non-negative value and is not subject
to depreciation, implying that ˙ Qj (s)=qj (s).3 Notice, that qj (s) can be negative; i.e., the
collector is always free to sell at the price p(s) some pieces of art he owns at time s.
The representative collector receives a constant ﬂow of income denoted by y.A ta n yt i m e
his or her ﬂow budget constraint is thus given by
p(s)qj (s)+xj (s)=y.( 1 )
The artist’s career begins at time s =0 , implying that Qj (0) = 0.
S u p p o s et h ea r t i s td i e sa tt i m et,w h e r et is a random variable. We assume that the artist
dies with probability θdt in the unit interval dt. The Poisson arrival rate θ may take any
nonnegative value: θ =0indicates immortality, while θ →∞implies that death is imminent.
Given the Poisson distribution, the probability that the artist is still alive at time t amounts
to e−θt and the probability that the artist dies exactly at time t equals θe−θt.
If the artist dies at time t, the price of his or her works of art will remain constant
afterwards. This is so because the price depends (ceteris paribus) only on the accumulated
stock Q, and this stock does not change anymore after the artist’s death if losses and faking
are ruled out: ˙ Q(s)=0for s>t . A f t e rt h ea r t i s t ’ sd e a t hn or e l e v a n tn e wi n f o r m a t i o n
appears since we disregard changes in preferences and substitution eﬀects in the art market;
the collectors’ portfolios will thus not change anymore (qj (s)=0for s>t )i ft h er a t eo f
time preference equals the interest rate, and we have xj (s)=y. Hence, the collectors’ total
utility after time t will depend on the holdings of the artist’s oeuvre Qj (t) at time t and the
exogenously given ﬂow of income y. As a result, the present discounted value of total utility
3In the literature on durable-goods monopolies, several authors have pointed out that the presence of a
positive depreciation rate profoundly aﬀects the characteristics of the resulting equilibrium (see, for example,
Bond and Samuelson, 1987, and Karp, 1996). Even though we admit that works of art do get destroyed or
lost at times, our assumption does not appear to be immoderately restrictive.
6after time t,
R ∞
t U (y,Qj (t))e−rsds = U (y,Qj (t))e−rt/r, turns out to be constant.
Using this fact and exploiting the properties of the Possion distribution, the expected
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¸
ds.( 2 )
The collector’s problem thus consists in choosing at each point in time s<tthe consumption
bundle (xj (s),q j (s)) that maximizes his or her expected present value of total lifetime utility
(2) subject to the budget constraint (1),
˙ Qj = qj, (3)
xj ≥ 0, (4)
where the symbol of time s is omitted whenever misunderstandings can be ruled out.







































−(r+θ)sλ(s)Qj (s)=0 , (7)
7where λ is the co-state variable associated with the state variable Q.E q u a t i o n (5) states
that in equilibrium the marginal utility of consumption of the non-durable good equals the
marginal utility of holding the price-adjusted stock of art work. Equation (6) describes the
evolution of the shadow price associated with the holdings of the artist’s oeuvre as long as the
artist is alive.4
S i n c ei ti so u ro b j e c t i v et od e r i v ec o m p a r a t i v e - s t a t i ca n dc o m p a r a t i v e - d y n a m i cr e s u l t s
we need to arrive at a closed-form solution. We therefore further restrict our analysis to
instantaneous utility functions that are separable in Qj and xj,a n dq u a d r a t i ci nQj;t h a ti s :
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Diﬀerentiating the logarithmic transformation of (8) with respect to time and substituting the
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Since the collector can buy or sell pieces of art in an eﬃc i e n tm a r k e ta tt h em a r k e tp r i c ep(s),
the marginal beneﬁt from the last dollar spent on art at any time s equals the marginal cost
of doing so, whereby the marginal beneﬁt corresponds to the expected marginal utility of the
ﬂow of art services per dollar ([1 + (θ/r)](∂U/∂Qj)/p =[ 1+( θ/r)](a − Qj)/p)i nt e r m so f
the marginal utility of non-durable consumption (∂U/∂xj = x
−1
j ) plus the percentage expected
capital gain ( ˙ p/p). The marginal cost corresponds to the sum of the marginal cost of waiting,
that is, the rate of time preference, r, plus the risk premium associated with the artist’s death,




to the case of the standard durable-goods monopoly without depreciation (see, for example, Kahn, 1986).
8θ, and the utility loss caused by a reduction in non-durable goods consumption. Exploiting
symmetry and integrating (10) o v e rt h eu n i tm a s so fa l lc o l l e c t o r sy i e l d st h em a r k e td e m a n d :
˙ p
p










which also represents a rational expectation constraint for the artist.
2.2 The supply side: the artist’s behavior
Artists ﬁnd themselves in the position of durable goods monopolists. Their market power is,
however, limited by the fact that they are not able to make perfect contractual arrangements
with the collectors. We assume the artist to maximize the present discounted return net of
the disutility incurred from devoting labor eﬀort to artistic production. Disutility is measured
in monetary units and described by the standard quadratic cost function C (q)=( b/2)q2.
The standard interpretation of the objective function (12) below presumes that the artist’s
m o t i v e sa r ep u r e l yc o m m e r c i a l . I fo n eb e l i e v e st h a ta r t i s t sa r er a t h e rd r i v e nb ya nu r g et o
achieve eminence in the art world, one can easily re-interpret the objective function (12) to
accommodate artistic pursuits. The price p,a f t e ra l l ,r e ﬂects the connoisseurs’ appreciation of
the artist’s eﬀorts, which implies that pQ represents a valid measure of artistic achievement.
Whichever the appropriate interpretation may be, the artist takes the inter-temporal op-
timizing behavior of the collectors as given and chooses a production pattern to maximize
lifetime utility. The artist’s problem therefore consists in choosing q(s) over s ∈ [0,∞) in or-













subject to (1), (3) and (11),a n dQ(0) = 0. Note that the exponential probability of dying at
time s simply increases the artist’s eﬀective rate of time preference. After substitution of (1),
the current-value Hamiltonian of the artist’s problem has the following appearance:
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and the transversality conditions have the following appearance:
lim
s→∞e
−(r+θ)sµ1 (s)Q(s) = lim
s→∞e
−(r+θ)sµ2 (s)p(s) = lim
s→∞e
−(r+θ)sµ3 (s)x(s)=0 ,
where the µi (i =1 ,2,3) denote the shadow prices associated with the stock Q(s),t h ep r i c e
p, and consumption x, respectively. We assume that the artist is always active until he or she
dies, i.e. the non-negativity constraint on q(s) is almost never binding.
3 Price and production during the artist’s lifetime
Combining and manipulating the optimality conditions of the artist’s and the collectors’ prob-
lems we obtain the following equations (17)-(20) which summarize our system of price and
production dynamics. Equation (19) is simply a restatement of (11); the other three equations
are derived in Appendix A.
˙ Q = q =
1
p







































where Ω(x,p) ≡ (r + θ)/[2(xp/y)+b(y/p)].
3.1 The steady state
In the steady state of the dynamic system (17)-(20) that governs the development of the
endogenous variables during the artist’s lifetime we have ˙ Q =0in (17) and thus obtain ¯ q =0 ,
which implies via the collectors’ budget constraint (1)
¯ x = y, (21)
where a bar indicates the steady state value of the corresponding variable. Using this result








¯ µ2 = −
¡
a − ¯ Q
¢
. (23)
Note, that the steady state conditions (22) and (23) are not suﬃcient to uniquely determine
¯ Q, ¯ p and ¯ µ2. This is because the equations of the dynamic system (17)-(20) (and thus the long
run equilibrium conditions (21)-(23)) are linearly dependent on each other since the budget
constraint (1) needs always to be met. This does however not imply that the adjustment path
and the steady state of the model are indeterminate. After having derived the explicit time
paths characterized by (17)-(20), we can use the initial conditions (µ2(0) = 0 and Q(0) = 0)
and the steady state conditions (21)-(23) to identify the unique adjustment paths and the
unique steady state. Since it is, in general, impossible to derive the adjustment paths of the
11endogenous variables by solving the non-linear dynamic system (17)-(20),w ef o c u so nt h e
linearized system. As shown in Appendix C, ¯ p is implicitly and uniquely determined (see
equation C3).
Note, however, that the following proposition holds for the original non-linear system as
well as for the linearized version thereof (The proof is to be found in Appendix C):
Proposition 1
(i) The steady-state stock ¯ Q of the artist’s works varies positively with the natural mortality
rate θ, the collectors’ income y and their appreciation a of the artist’s works of art, and neg-
atively with the marginal cost b of production and the interest rate r.
(ii) The steady-state price ¯ p of the artist’s works varies positively with the collectors’ income
y, their appreciation a of the artist’s works of art and the marginal cost b of production, and
negatively with the natural mortality rate θ and the interest rate r.
These results are quite intuitive. The larger the natural mortality rate, the more the artist
is inclined to exploit the market in the short run. In other words, a shorter life expectancy
induces the artist to be very productive and to sell more works of art at earlier stages of his
life. This strategy results in a large oeuvre and low art prices if the artist is lucky enough
to beat the odds and to grow to an old age. Production is also stimulated if the collectors
have a high income or if they especially appreciate the artist’s work. This demand eﬀect not
only increases production but also the price of the art work. High interest rates, on the other
hand, imply that the collectors heavily discount future utility streams associated with the art
portfolio, thereby reducing demand for works of art. As a result, art prices decrease and so
does production. If, ﬁnally, disutility associated with artistic eﬀort is high (as captured by a
high value of the parameter b), the supply of works of art is low and prices are high.
3.2 The dynamic adjustment
In order to describe how p and Q (or, equivalently, q) change during the artist’s career, we
linearize our dynamic system (17)-(20) around the steady state and arrive at the following
12linearized system:
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Q − ¯ Qx − ¯ xp − ¯ pµ 2 − ¯ µ2
¸T
, (24)
where ¯ Ω ≡ Ω(y, ¯ p).T h e a r t i s t ’ s o e u v r e Q is, of course, by virtue of being a stock variable,
predetermined. The shadow variable µ2 is associated with the evolution of p,w h i c h ,v i a(10),
dictates the inter-temporal behavior of the collectors. Since there is no restriction on the initial
value of p, µ2 (0) equals zero.5 In our model, the price is thus a jump variable which stands in
sharp contrast with the standard models of durable-goods monopolies with a continuous price
expectations function which does not allow discontinuous price changes.
To sum up, we have two jump variables, p and x, in our system (24). In Appendix B, we
show that there are indeed two unstable (i.e. positive) roots. According to Buiter (1984), the
system exhibits saddle-point stability, implying the existence of a unique stable (non-explosive)
solution of the dynamic system (24),w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
Q(s)=
¡
Q(0) − ¯ Q
¢
e
Λs + ¯ Q =
¡
1 − e
Λs¢ ¯ Q, (25)
5More precisely, if the initial value of λ (alternatively, x and p)i n(9) is controllable, the leader (=artist)
is free to choose any value λ(0) (see Dockner et al., 2000), so that the optimal value of the associated co-state
variable µ2(0) should be set equal to zero. Nevertheless, µ2 (t1) 6=0for any t1 > 0 due to the evolution of
µ2 (s) governed by (20) over time. This discrepancy gives rise to a time-inconsistent solution. To show this, we
suppose that the original solution is expressed by (Q∗(s),p ∗(s),x ∗(s),µ ∗
2(s))w i t hQ∗(0) = 0 and µ∗
2(0) = 0 for
s ∈ [0,∞). When the artist is allowed to replan her optimal production plan at time t1 in the sense that from
t1 > 0 onwards she is no longer bound to the initially announced production path q∗(s) for s ∈ [0,∞),s h e
will choose a new solution (Q∗∗(s),p ∗∗(s),x ∗∗(s),µ ∗∗
2 (s))w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes µ∗∗
2 (s)=0 ,t a k i n gQ∗∗(t1)=Q∗(t1)
as given for s ∈ [t1,∞).S i n c et h i sn e wv a l u eµ∗∗
2 (t1)=0is not equal to µ∗
2(t1) 6=0 , the artist will announce
a new production path q∗∗(s) for s ∈ [t1,∞) which does not coincide with the remaining part of the original
production path announced by her at time 0, q∗(s).
13p(s)=p(0) = ¯ p, (26)
x(s)=( x(0) − ¯ x)e
Λs +¯ x =¯ p ¯ QΛe
Λs + y, (27)
µ2 (s)=( µ2 (0) − ¯ µ2)e
Λs +¯ µ2 =
¡






where Λ is the unique stable (negative) root (i.e. the negative root of λ in (B2) of Appendix B).
The variables p(0) and x(0) are the endogenously determined initial values of p(s) and x(s).
More precisely, since the variables p and x can freely jump, these initial values have to be chosen
such that the adjustment path lies on the stable arm of the saddle-point. Indeed, it follows
from (24) that x(s)− ¯ x = −¯ pΛ
£
Q(s) − ¯ Q
¤
, which implies x(0) = y− ¯ pΛ ¯ Q. Substituting this
initial value into the middle expression in (27) yields the last expression.
Interestingly, the price p settles at once at the steady state level, so that p remains constant
during the transition of the system towards the steady state as long as no new exogenous
disturbance of the system occurs. To see this, we use the budget constraint (1) in conjunction







¯ pΛ ¯ QeΛs + y
¤
−Λ ¯ QeΛs =¯ p for s ∈ [0,∞),
inferring from (25) that q(s)= ˙ Q(s)=−Λ ¯ QeΛs.
As Λ (< 0)g e t ss m a l l e r ,t h eo e u v r eQ(s) and consumption x(s) are approaching their
steady state values at a more rapid rate. On the other hand, the production ﬂow q(s) is
gradually falling to zero as the artist grows older. These results are summarized in:
Proposition 2 The market for works of visual art as portrayed by the linearized model (24)
exhibits a unique and stable rational expectations equilibrium path. Along this path production
gradually declines to zero as the artist grows older; the artist’s oeuvre thus converges to an
upper limit ¯ Q. The art price remains constant at the steady state level during the artist’s
entire career.
14The proof immediately follows from (25)-(28) in conjunction with (C3).
Our Stackelberg solution characterized by (17)-(20) is not time consistent for the reason
outlined in footnote 5. The artist thus has, in principle, an incentive to choose a new pro-
d u c t i o np l a na ta n yt i m et1 > 0. However, the time paths for the linearized system, i.e.
(25) − (28), continue to hold for the linearized system associated with this new production
plan that satisﬁes µ2 (t1)=0 . This is so because the optimal paths of p(s), Q(s) and x(s)
characterized by (25) − (27) do not depend on the evolution of µ2 (s) given by (28).T h e
linearized paths of p(s), Q(s) and x(s) can therefore be used to characterize the time paths
associated with the time-consistent solution. This peculiarity depends of course on the special
structure of our model. It allows us to arrive at very general conclusions with respect to the
comparative-dynamic properties of our model which we will turn to in the following sections.
4 Comparative-dynamic properties
In this section we investigate how changes in the structural parameters of our model occurring
during the artist’s lifetime aﬀect the time paths of the model’s crucial endogenous variables.
The eﬀects depend of course on whether the disturbance is transitory or permanent, as well
as on whether the respective shocks have been anticipated or not.6 Since the structural
parameters of our model describe the socio-economic environment of the art scene, we focus
on the eﬀects of permanent and unanticipated changes.
A change of the model’s parameters at time t, gives rise to the following impact on ﬂow
production:
6In the literature on macroeconomic dynamics (see, for example, Turnovsky, 2000), these distinctions play
a key role in evaluating the eﬀects of policy changes.
15dq (s)
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¡ ¯ Q − Q(t)
¢
< 0, (33)
where (+) and (-) indicate the sign of the respective terms (notice that ¯ Q>Q(t) and Λ < 0).
The impact eﬀects on ﬂow production q are governed by two eﬀects: (1) the eﬀect on the
steady state stock (oeuvre) of the artist’s works, and (2) the eﬀect on the speed of art
production (i.e. dΛ/dk for k = θ,y,r,a,b). The signs of d ¯ Q/dk (k = θ,y,r,a,b)h a v eb e e n
described in Proposition 1. It is quite intuitive that an increase in the steady state level
of the oeuvre induces an increase in ﬂow production. The speed-eﬀect works through two
channels. On the one hand, the speed of adjustment is inﬂuenced via changes in the steady
state price (i.e. (∂Λ/∂¯ p)(d¯ p/dk)). This adjustment reﬂects intertemporal substitution, i.e.
higher future prices induce the artist to postpone production, while lower future prices induce
him or her to expand current production. On the other hand, the speed of adjustment depends
on speciﬁce ﬀects which directly aﬀect the rate of production (i.e. ∂Λ/∂k, k = θ,y,r,a,b).
A higher mortality rate θ, for example, implies that future utility is discounted more heavily,
thus rendering the artist more myopic which, in turn, stimulates production (i.e. ∂Λ/∂θ < 0).
This is the direct adjustment-speed eﬀect. The indirect adjustment-speed eﬀect which works
through price changes, operates in the same direction: A higher θ decreases prices and therefore
increases current production because the artist is induced to sell more at earlier stages of his
16career ((∂Λ/∂¯ p)(d¯ p/dθ) < 0). The steady-state eﬀect, ﬁnally, is given by d ¯ Q/dθ < 0.T h e
impact eﬀect on q(t) is therefore unambiguously positive, as illustrated in Figure 1. The
impact eﬀect of cost b on ﬂow production q is also unambiguous: Higher values of b create an
incentive to spread the artist’s production over time, thereby reducing his current production
(see Figure 5). This reaction is consistent with the behavior of all durable-goods monopolists
faced with increased marginal cost of production.
Turning to the other exogenous variables of the model, aﬀairs become more complex. The
increase in demand caused by the increase in income y stimulates production, and thus raises
the price which in turn discourages current production. Although these two eﬀects operate in
opposite directions, the latter eﬀect dominates (see Figure 2). The eﬀect of r on the speed
of adjustment Λ is ambiguous and thus induces an ambiguous total eﬀect on ﬂow production.
Even though an increase in a unambiguously reduces the adjustment-speed eﬀect, the steady-
state eﬀect on ¯ Q is positive, resulting in an ambiguous net eﬀect on production (see Figure 4).
Nevertheless, when the path of Q(t) is suﬃciently close to the steady state (i.e. Q(t) ' ¯ Q for
suﬃciently large t), the steady state eﬀects of r and a will dominate, implying that the signs
of dq(t)/dr and dq(t)/da will be consistent with their respective steady-state eﬀects. Note also
that the respective impact eﬀects on the price coincide with the corresponding steady-state
eﬀects, implying that "perverse" impact eﬀects never occur. All these results (the respective
proofs are to be found in Appendix D) are summarized in
Proposition 3
(i) An unanticipated permanent increase in the natural mortality rate θ gives rise to a discon-
tinuous increase in art production q and causes the price p of the artist’s works to drop;
(ii) An unanticipated permanent increase in income y gives rise to a discontinuous increase
in production q and causes the price p to increase on impact;
(iii) An unanticipated permanent increase in the interest rate r (the appreciation a of the
artist’s works) can give rise to either a decrease or an increase in art production q; the price
p however unambiguously drops (increases);
(iv) An unanticipated permanent increase in the cost b of art production gives rise to a decrease
















Figure 1: The eﬀects of θ
5 The death eﬀect
In this section we show that the unanticipated death of a visual artist is followed by a discon-
tinuous increase in the price of his of her works of art. If the artist’s death does not come as a
surprise, the discontinuous price increase will occur when the public learns about the artist’s
imminent death.
Suppose the artist unexpectedly dies at time t. T h ep r o d u c t i o no fw o r k so fa r tt h a tb e a r
the deceased artist’s idiosyncratic way of expression thus ceases, and the stock of this kind of
works of art remains constant thereafter. Since the late artist’s works are no longer traded in
our model world in which nothing happens after the artist’s death, consumption of the non-
durable composite good now equals the ﬂow of income, that is, x(t)=y. As a consequence,
the price of the late artist’s works will also remain constant after the death-induced impact




























































Figure 5: The eﬀects of b
20As long as the artist is alive and in good health, the price, denoted by palive (s),i sa l w a y s









Since for any ﬁnite s we have ¯ Q>Q(s), it turns out that pdeath >p alive (s). In other words,
the price p of the artist’s works increases on impact when the artist’s death is revealed to
the public. The eﬀect of the artist’s (unanticipated) death on the price p is illustrated in the
lower panel of Figure 6, while the eﬀect on the time path of q is depicted in the upper panel.
Equations (34) and (35) demonstrate that the death eﬀect ∆p(t) ≡ pdeath (t) − palive (t)=
(y/r)
¡ ¯ Q − Q(t)
¢
> 0 (for t<∞) varies negatively with the ﬁnal size Q(t) of the artist’s
oeuvre. Since an artist’s oeuvre increases with age, this implies that the death eﬀect varies
negatively with the artist’s age at death. This result is not due to the fact that the death of
an old person is more likely (and thus less surprising) than the death of a young one. As a
matter of fact, this eﬀect is not captured in our model because we have assumed the natural
death rate θ to be constant. It is remarkable that this negative age eﬀect materializes even
when one counterfactually assumes a constant natural death rate.
We now turn to investigating the eﬀects of an artist’s death that does not come as a
surprise. Consider the case in which an artist’s terminal illness is made public at time t,a n d
assume that on the basis of this announcement the collectors are in a position to correctly
anticipate the artist’s death at time T (>t ).7 Nevertheless, the announcement at time t itself
comes as a surprise and therefore does give rise to an impact eﬀect on the price p of the ailing





−rsU (x(s),Q(s))ds + e
−r(T−t)U (y,Q(T)),
subject to (3),(4), and the initial condition Q(t).T h eﬁrst-order necessary condition and the
terminal condition are given by 8:
7Keith Haring’s biography might serve as an example. Haring who was diagnosed with AIDS in 1988 enlisted
during the last years of his life his artistic standing to generate activism and awareness about this decease.
Via the establishment of the Haring Foundations these activities were well publicized with the consequence














alive = p 











Since the age at death, T, is no longer a random variable after the news has been revealed,
the parameter θ does not appear anymore in (36) and (37). Solving the artist’s optimization
problem on the basis of this modiﬁcation results in the adjustment path given by (25)-(28)
with r + θ being replaced by r. After the announcement the price, denoted by pafter (s),






In order to establish whether the impact eﬀect on the price is positive or negative, we compare
pafter (t) with pbefore (t)=¯ p = y
¡
a − ¯ Q
¢
/r. This simply amounts to comparing the size of
Q(T) and ¯ Q. Given the size of the artist’s oeuvre at time t, Q(t), the path of Q(s) (s ≥ t)
22is given by














2¯ p2 + yb
⎤
⎦.
It can now easily be seen from (38) that Q(s)=Q(t) at s = t and Q(s)=Q(T) at s = T.









Q(T)= ˆ Q.N o t i n gt h a tb yd e ﬁnition Q(T) < ˆ Q for T<∞,w ec o m p a r e ¯ Q with
ˆ Q. Using the facts that the steady state level ˆ Q is reached when θ =0and that d ¯ Q/dθ > 0,i t
is immediate that ˆ Q< ¯ Q. We therefore conclude that pafter(t) > ˆ p>¯ p,w h e r eˆ p =( a− ˆ Q)/r,
i.e. the price increases when the announcement is made. Moreover, note that the size of the
price increase varies negatively with the lead time T − t.
At time T no new information is revealed, implying that there will be no price jump at
T; q(s) therefore continuously converges to zero as s converges to T. To measure the impact
eﬀect of the announcement on the ﬂow supply q at time t,w ed i ﬀerentiate (38) with respect
to time to obtain
dQ(s)
ds




ˆ Λ(t−T) − 1
. (40)
By comparing (40) with q(s)=−Λ ¯ QeΛs, it turns out that the announcement eﬀect on q(s) is
ambiguous because 0 > ˆ Λ > Λ and ¯ Q> ˆ Q>Q(T)−Q(t),b u te
ˆ Λ(t−T)/[e
ˆ Λ(t−T)−1] >e Λt when
evaluated at time s = t. This ambiguity stems from two conﬂicting eﬀects: an intertemporal
substitution eﬀect caused by higher future prices which tends to reduce production, and an
eﬀect relating to the shorter lifetime which stimulates current production.
We summarize these results in our ﬁnal
Proposition 4


















Figure 7: The eﬀects of anticipated death
on impact by the amount of ∆p(t)=( y/r)
¡ ¯ Q − Q(t)
¢
,w h e r eQ(t) represents the ﬁnal size
of the artist’s oeuvre. The size of the impact eﬀects on the price is inversely related to the
artist’s age at death.
(ii) When, at time t, an artist’s impending death at time T is announced, the price p of the
artist’s works immediately increases by (y/r)
¡ ¯ Q − Q(T)
¢
, and remains constant thereafter,
although ﬂow production may gradually rise or fall after the announcement. The size of the
impact eﬀect on the price p varies negatively with (1) the age t at which the artist’s impending
death is announced and (2) the artist’s remaining lifetime T − t.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Unless durable goods monopolists are in a position to make credible commitments to restrain
their output, the consumers will always anticipate that the producers will have an incentive to
increase the output in the future in order to skim the remaining willingness to pay. The con-
24sumers’ time-consistent anticipation therefore exerts a downward pressure on the prices which
will, as a consequence, immediately settle at the competitive level. Since credible commitment
devices are hard to come by, Coase conjectured in his famous 1972 article that durable goods
monopolists, as a rule, oﬀer competitive prices. Artistic production may, however, follow dif-
ferent rules because the artistic temperament is liable to impose certain constraints on an
artist’s production pattern. To what extent such an implicit commitment prevails, is an open
question. In any event, the death of a visual artist can be interpreted to represent the ultimate
device to restrain output. The fact that all artists are eventually, nolens volens, forced to make
use of this device, provided the motivation for our study.
We arrive at the conclusion that all prices of visual works of art, whether the artist has
been able to commit to an optimal production plan or not, are subject to a positive death
eﬀect. Moreover, if an artist is known to have an above-average mortality rate, or if the artist
is known to suﬀer from a terminal illness and will die at a foreseeable point of time, his or
her works of art will, ceteris paribus, fetch a higher price. Finally, we show that the death
eﬀect deceases with the artist’s age at death. This is so because older artists produce less
than younger ones; the death of an old artist thus implies a relatively small reduction in the
expected size of his or her oeuvre which, in turn, causes a relatively small price increase.
Our analysis has made use of several shortcuts imposed by analytical convenience. First
of all, our analysis does not allow us to characterize the time consistent production plan of
an artist who cannot credibly commit to an optimal production strategy. We have pointed
out, however, that the linearized paths of our open-loop Stackelberg solution reﬂect time
consistency in the sense that these time paths are independent of whether the artist does or
does not reoptimize at any intermediate point of time.
More restrictive is probably our assumption that an artist’s reputation is constant. Rep-
utation is clearly an endogenous variable and can only be acquired by a substantial track
record of outstanding artistic achievements over an artist’s entire life cycle. Works of young
promising artists may nevertheless be bought at a relatively high price by connoisseurs be-
cause they expect the artist to achieve eminence in the future. If such an aspiring artist dies
at a relatively young age, the collectors’ expectations of future fame are frustrated and the
25price of the artist’s works may, as a consequence, decrease after his death. In their empirical
study, Ursprung and Wiermann (2008) have indeed shown that the death eﬀect is negative
if an artist dies an untimely death. The death eﬀect of frustrated positive expectations thus
countervails the death eﬀect portrayed in our model, i.e. the death eﬀect which derives from
averted negative expectations of an excessively large future production.
A further important aspect of artistic production that we did not consider in our analysis is
that the artist is confronted with a trade-oﬀ between quantity and quality. We rather assumed
that works of art are reproducible at will, just as factory-produced goods. This assumption
is, as we have pointed out above, not too far removed from a fair representation of how some
late 20th century artists produce. Nevertheless, we do of course acknowledge that this is not
true for all modern artists and certainly not for all periods. Moreover, we readily acknowledge
that creativity may change over the life cycle which would imply a change of quality as the
artists grows older. Since quality is the main determinant of prices, all these considerations
need to be taken into account if one attempts to arrive at a well-proportioned portrait of art
price formation in general, and the death eﬀect in particular.
Appendix A
Equation (17) follows from substitution of (1) into (3).T a k e a t i m e d i ﬀerentiation of the
























































































Further substitution of (A3) and (11) into (A5) and manipulation yields (18).
Finally, we can easily show that substitution of (A3) into (15) leads to (20).
Appendix B
T h ec h a r a c t e r i s t i ce q u a t i o nf o rt h eJ a c o b i a nm a t r i xi nt h ed y n a m i cs y s t e m(24) is given by
(r + θ − λ)λ
∙
λ
2 − (r + θ)λ −
2(r + θ)





It is immediate that equation (B1) has two roots, 0 and r + θ, while the other two roots are
given by solving the quadratic equation λ
2 − (r + θ)λ − [2(r + θ)y2/(2¯ p2 + yb)r]=0 .T h e
latter roots are of the form
λ3,4 =










It is immediately seen that since the argument inside the square root function in (B2) is
positive, the two roots are real. Moreover, the larger of the roots is positive, while the smaller
of the roots is negative. Taken together, we have one negative root, two positive roots and
the zero root. The zero root implies that the determinant of the Jacobian in (24) is equal
to zero. It means that one of the diﬀerential equations is a multiple of the other (i.e., they
are linearly dependent), so there are really only three equations characterizing the dynamics
of this system. This happens because the dynamics characterized by (25) − (28) (or (24))i s
27linked by the instantaneous budget constraint (1) at any moment in time.
Appendix C
Using the equation appearing in the third row of the matrix appearing on the left-hand side
of (24) and noting that p(s)=¯ p for all times, we have
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¯ p¯ Ω − (r + θ)








[µ2 (s) − ¯ µ2]=0 . (C1)
Using (25) and (27),w eh a v ex(s)−¯ x = −¯ pΛ
£
Q(s) − ¯ Q
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[µ2 (s) − ¯ µ2]=0 ,
which is, by substituting (28) and deleting the term Q(s) − ¯ Q, reduced into
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Further manipulation of (C2) coupled with the deﬁnition of ¯ Ω results in
2+b
y




ay − r¯ p
=0 . (C3)
L e tu sd e n o t et h el e f t - h a n ds i d eo f( C 3 )a sf (p;θ,y,r,a).D i ﬀerentiate f (.) with respect















(ay − r¯ p)
2 < 0, (C4)
which is signed by noting that 2Λ+¯ p(∂Λ/∂p) < 0. By employing the implicit function theorem







because ∂f/∂θ =¯ p2 (r/y2)(∂Λ/∂θ) < 0 (due to ∂Λ/∂θ < 0).M o r e o v e r ,d i ﬀerentiation of (22)






















































(ay − r¯ p)
2 > 0 (due to −2Λ + y(∂Λ/∂y) > 0)













































(ay − r¯ p)
2 < 0 (due to Λ+r(∂Λ/∂r) < 0)a n d−r(∂f/∂r)+



























because ∂f/∂a = yr¯ p/(ay − r¯ p)
















because ∂f/∂b =( y/¯ p2)+p2 (r/y2)(∂Λ/∂b) > 0 (due to ∂Λ/∂b>0).
29Appendix D
The instantaneous impact on a permanent change in, say the probability of death, θ,o nt h e















We diﬀerentiate x(s) − ¯ x = −¯ pΛ
£
Q(s) − ¯ Q
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Once again using x(s)−¯ x = −¯ pΛ
£
Q(s) − ¯ Q
¤
with y =¯ x and expressing dΛ/dθ ≡ (∂Λ/∂¯ p)(d¯ p/dθ)+
(∂Λ/∂θ),( D 3 )c a nb er e w r i t t e na s(29).
In an analogous way, we can show the eﬀects of permanent changes in other parameters
on q(t) are given by (30)-(33).
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